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NOTICE AND FREEDOM OF
CONTRACT IN THE LAW OF
SERVITUDES
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*
The two principal articles of this symposium exhibit a remarkable unity
of purpose in their treatment of the law of easements, real covenants,
and equitable servitudes. Both authors recognize-and Professor
Reichman masterfully chronicles-the history by which three separate
institutions have emerged in our law to regulate the ways in which one
pbrson may have nonpossessory rights in land owned and occupied by
another. Both authors identify a host of nineteenth century concerns
that have influenced the development of the law.1 Finally, both ad-
vance a unified theory of servitudes to govern all nonpossessory inter-
ests, a theory which covers their creation, interpretation, transfer,
extinction, and enforcement.
With this much I am in complete agreement, and to it I can add
little. My concerns instead go to the normative question of what legal
rules should be applied to the unified structure. This inquiry in turn
leads us back to a theme persistent in all legal discourse: the tension
between private volition and social control.' When should the law de-
* James Parker Hall Professor of Law, University of Chicago. A.B. 1964, Columbia; B.A.
1966, Oxford University; LL.B. 1968, Yale. Douglas G. Baird and Richard H. Helmholz provided
valuable comments on an earlier draft of this Comment.
1. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1261, 1281-1304 (1982); Reichman, Towarda Unfied Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1177, 1186-1211 (1982).
Two illustrations show the magnitude of the problem. The rules concerning the assignability
of real covenants seem odd at first glance, but they are explanable in historical terms as an excep-
tion to the common-law rule which prohibited the assignment of contract rights. In a legal envi-
ronment in which the benefits of ordinary contracts as a matter of law are not assignable, rules
which permit the assignment of certain covenants running with land are a marked improvement
over the older order.
In similar fashion, the traditional requirement that restrictions between neighbors must be
included in a conveyance in order to be binding upon assigns may be attributed to the absence of
an effective system of recordation: naked covenants could not be discovered by subsequefit pur-
chasers through a reasonable inspection of title.
2. See, e.g., F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 2 (2 ed.
1970).
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fer to the intentions of the various parties, and to what extent should
the law limit individual freedom of action? The purpose of this Com-
ment is to propose that under a unified theory of servitudes, the only
need for public regulation, either judicial or legislative, is to provide
notice by recordation of the interests privately created.3
The defense of this thesis begins with a familiar distinction. In any
system of property law, a complete specification of rights and duties
raises two separate questions. The first question concerns the alloca-
tion of rights and duties between the parties to the original transaction,
grant, or conveyance. The second question concerns the rights and du-
ties of those participants against the rest of the world. In general, there
is a very strong case for applying the doctrine of freedom of contract to
the rights and duties between the parties: a grant is, after all, a com-
pleted contract, which often imposes obligations after title is trans-
ferred-for example, warranty of title. The rest of the world, however,
is not a party to the transaction, and by ordinary contract rules cannot
be bound by it. For example, a conveyance that states that a prospec-
tive purchaser shall not be liable for nuisances caused to third parties
will have no effect upon the right of any third party to maintain a cause
of action for nuisance.
The real problem does not concern possible tort law complica-
tions, but arises when a third party wishes to acquire an ownership
interest in the subject property. The initial problem he must face is to
determine with whom he should deal. The natural answer to this ques-
tion is the owner. A buyer of personal property, for example, acts at his
peril if he negotiates a purchase with a nonowner in possession of the
goods. The original owner can recover by an action for conversion the
chattel or its value, and the buyer's good faith is no defense. A system
of recordation reverses this general rule and requires the owner to take
steps for his own protection by giving notice of his interest to the world
at large.
One central question concerns the circumstances under which it is
appropriate to impose a recordation requirement on the owners of vari-
ous forms of property. Land is an obvious candidate for recordation
because it is permanent and in one location. Simple rules can require
filing in the county where the land is situated. In addition, there are
strong pressures to divide land into multiple interests and, as questions
3. The question of whether antitrust or antidiscrimination principles should apply to the
law of servitudes is beyond the scope of this Comment. The Comment's primary concern is the
limitations upon freedom of contract that are unique to various land transactions.
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of title become more complex, recordation becomes all the more neces-
sary. Who will be prepared to buy a remainder interest, or to accept
property as security for a loan, if faced with the specter of having to
.authenticate title in a subsequent proceeding brought by a disappointed
rival claimant to the fee?
To be sure, one may try to accommodate multiple interests in land
without recordation. In the days before recordation, the buyer could
protect himself by requiring a physical transfer of title deeds with
purchased land, thereby preventing the original seller from showing the
deeds to a second purchaser as evidence of retained title. That method,
however, was effective only with total conveyances of land. It did not
work where the original seller retained a part interest in land such as a
life estate, and under it so simple an arrangement as a second mortgage
placed innumerable pressures upon the legal system.
One response to this problem would be to limit the nature of the
interests which can be created, thereby reducing the need to seek out
the proper parties with whom to transact. This is in essence what hap-
pened in the law of personal property, where, as a general rule, the
creation of life estates and similar limited interests in chattels is prohib-
ited. Similarly, a system of real estate law that allowed only a fee inter-
est would be far simpler than one which allowed all complex forms of
life estates and remainders. But an enormous cost would be incurred
through such a Draconic measure: it would preclude voluntary trans-
actions by competent individuals who in principle should have as much
right to sell a future interest in Blackacre as they have to sell its back
forty acres.
With land, therefore, powerful institutional incentives work to re-
verse the traditional presumption of nemo dat quod non habet-that no
one can convey what he does not own-applicable in conversion cases.
Instead, the law allows a nonowner to convey good title to a second
purchaser unless the first purchaser, by giving record notice to the
world, takes steps to protect his interest. The genius of the recordation
system is that it allows a purchaser to determine with whom he must
deal, without restricting the richness and variety of possible transac-
tions. Once recordation becomes an accepted social institution, it is
possible to dispense with the entire ancient learning on the difference
between legal and equitable interests, and the complicated rules of pri-
ority which they generate.4 Record notice becomes the uniform coin of
4. The priority rules are somewhat complicated. First, the holder of an equitable interest
will prevail only over a subsequent purchaser of the legal estate who has notice of his interest.
1982] 1355
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the realm. It is superior to actual notice and to any alternative form of
constructive notice, e.g., notorious possession, because of the greater
certainty it creates. And while it imposes upon prospective purchasers
the affirmative duty of search, it channels the search so required, and
thereby protects those who make the search with a completeness that
the common-law rules could not provide.
It might be argued that requiring interests in land to be forfeited if
not registered allows the taking of private property by the state. But
takings themselves are allowed if just compensation is provided; the
enormous reduction in uncertainty that recordation offers every partici-
pant within the system serves to justify the possibility of forfeiture.
There are no exclusions from the system, no disproportionate costs of
participation, and no efforts to favor select members of a certain social
or commercial class.5 The universal adoption of the system is justified
for the happiest of reasons. It leaves everyone better off than the older
rule of nemo dat quod non habet.
There are small, and unimportant, differences among the various
types of recordation statutes. Yet all recordation statutes, whether race,
(On a separate point, the prior equity holder will prevail over a subsequent donee. This rule
generally is left unchanged by recordation statutes.) Recordation supplies notice and thus pro-
vides equitable interests with the security of the classical legal estate. Second, the holder of a prior
legal estate takes priority over any subsequent taker claimant, legal or equitable, whether or not
the second taker has notice of the first estate. With recordation, however, there is no reason why
future purchasers should be prejudiced by undisclosed prior interests. Recordation is required,
thereby reducing the protection given prior legal interests to that given prior equitable ones. No
protection is afforded without notice (at least against subsequent purchasers); complete protection
is afforded with notice.
5. The proposition that it is "within the undoubted power of state legislatures to pass re-
cording acts, by which the elder grantee shall be postponed to a younger, if the prior deed is not
recorded within the limited time" withstood constitutional attack under the impairment of con-
tract clause, Jackson v. Lamphire, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 280, 290 (1830), at a time when the eminent
domain clause was held inapplicable against the states. Barron v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250-51 (1833). The only serious challenges to recordation statutes
have been with regard to their retroactive application. See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 102 S. Ct. 781,
793-94 (1982) (upholding such a statute in connection with mineral interests, but only by a five to
four vote).
It is possible to ask whether these statutes satisfy the "public use" requirement found explic-
itly in the eminent domain clause, but not in the impairment of contracts clause. Here the argu-
ment is that the property taken is not put to a public use if it ends up in the hands of the second
taker, a private party. In response it can be urged that the requirement is satisfied because in the
frequent case of compliance, recordation benefits the public at large, as everyone has access to the
information so recorded. Since the only way to procure the public benefit is through private
enforcement, i.e., the loss of priority, the ultimate private ownership should be tolerated as a
proper means to achieve the ultimate end. Whatever the theoretical soundness of the position, it
should be clear that the recordation system meets the current constitutional standards for public
use. See infra note 29.
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race-notice or pure notice share one vital feature: where recordation of
an interest is properly filed, it binds all subsequent takers.6 Actual no-
tice typically is provided by, and properly may be inferred from, proper
recordation. The purchase of land, when combined with a system of
recordation, provides constructive consent on the part of a purchaser to
the previous state of affairs between the immediate seller and any other
person who holds a servitude over the land.
The effects of notice through recordation, however, are not con-
fined to parties who claim through owners of the land subject to the
servitude. Notice also functions to stake out a claim of partial owner-
ship in lands possessed by another that, under the usual rules of tempo-
ral priority, will prevail over that of any subsequent party who claims
the burdened land by adverse possession. Without a recordation sys-
tem, it would be very difficult for the holder of a servitude to give no-
tice of his claims to parties outside the chain of title. This is especially
true for negative easements and restrictive covenants, where the land
itself bears no trace of the asserted servitude. The same difficulty can
arise in the case of ordinary easements where the tangible evidence of
user rights neither defines the scope of the interest nor distinguishes
between use as of right and use by mere license. Notice eliminates
these ambiguities and makes it possible to insist upon the very simple
rule of prescription noted by Professor Reichman: prescription starts to
run against the holder of the servitude, not with occupation of the sub-
ject land, but with its use by the adverse possessor in a fashion inconsis-
tent with the terms of the recorded servitude.7
The protection of strangers, then, is assured by record notice. The
only remaining question, therefore, is what limitation upon freedom of
contract should be imposed upon consenting parties, including parties
to the original grant and subsequent takers with record notice. In this
context the major task of the courts should be: (1) to interpret the
terms in the various grants; and (2) to supplement the terms by judicial
or legislative rule when the grant in question is silent on certain key
points. This principle is largely accepted by Professors French and
Reichman.s
6. On the relevant differences between the statutes, see Johnson, Purpose and Scope of Re-
cording Statutes, 47 IowA L. Rav. 231, 231-33 (1962).
7. Reichman, supra note 1, at 1248.
8. For example, courts are frequently called upon to interpret the rules governing subdivi-
sions made in accordance with a common plan. Developers typically insert covenants in the early
deed that are designed to benefit subsequent purchasers of the remaining lots, while similarly
inserting parallel covenants in the later deeds that indicate that the lots previously sold are to be
benefitted as well. Sensible rules of construction make it possible for any member of the subdivi-
1982] 1357
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My disagreement with the authors-and it is one that I express
with some caution-is directed to the question of whether there is any
room whatsoever left for public intervention once third party interests
are fully protected by record notice. Both authors argue for additional
public intervention. Professor Reichman wants to extend the touch
and concern requirement, drawn from the law of real covenants, to all
servitudes,9 a conclusion from which Professor French shrinks because
she believes that other forms of intervention are more effective.' 0 In
addition, both authors believe that courts should intervene either to de-
stroy or to modify servitudes that, because of changed conditions, have
become wasteful, obsolete, or unreasonable." My thesis is simple:
with notice secured by recordation, freedom of contract should control.
Neither of the restrictions upon freedom of contract proposed by
Professors Reichman and French should be accepted.
A. TOUCH AND CONCERN
The touch and concern requirement, as Professors Reichman and
French correctly note,'2 is not simply a redundant guarantee that the
original parties intended subsequent takers to be either benefitted or
burdened by a covenant. Instead, the requirement, whatever its precise
contours, serves as an independent substantive constraint that must be
satisfied before a covenant or other servitude can run with the land.
Professor Reichman defends the traditional treatment of real covenants
and urges its extension to all servitudes upon several grounds:
This somewhat unusual interventionist theory is justified be-
cause the permanent attachment to land of merely personal obliga-
tions is likely to frustrate the objectives of a private land holding
system.
In the first place, obligations not related to actual property use
are highly individualized. They tend, therefore, to become inefficient
in the short run following a transfer. Consensual termination of such
rights might not occur because of prohibitive transaction costs. The
best way to insure efficient termination of such arrangements is to
sion to sue any other member, wholly without regard to the sequence in which the lots are con-
veyed. As this is the clear intention of the parties, no clever rule of privity should prevent, for
example, the buyers of the earlier lots from suing the purchasers of the later ones. Both Reichman
and French agree. French, supra note 1, at 1305-06 & nn. 216-17; Reichman, supra note 1, at
1246-47.
9. Reichman, supra note 1, at 1232-33.
10. French, supra note 1, at 1308-10.
11. French, supra note 1, at 1316-18; Reichman, supra note 1, at 1258-59.
12. French, supra note 1, at 1289; Reichman, supra note 1, at 1233.
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shift the burden of negotiation; instead of making the transferee ne-
gotiate for a release, the aspiring beneficiary will have to reach agree-
ment with each new owner. Personal contracts remain the subject of
personal bargains.
There is another reason for the "touch and concern" rule. Pri-
vate property is sanctioned by society not only to promote efficiency,
but also to safeguard individual freedom. Servitudes are a kind of
private legislation affecting a line of future owners. Limiting such
"legislative powers" to an objective purpose of land planning elimi-
nates the possibility of creating modern variations of feudal serfdom.
There might be nothing objectionable in personal agreements con-
cerning personal labor, adherence to ideologically prescribed modes
of behavior, or promises to buy from a certain supplier. When such
obligations, however, become permanently enforced against an ever-
changing group of owners, the matter acquires different
dimensions. 13
This argument resonates with familiar themes of liberty and effi-
ciency. On both scores, however, I think it wrong. Insistence that the
attachment of merely personal obligations to land is likely to frustrate,
rather than enhance, the objectives which a private land holding system
seeks to realize presupposes that we have some collective vision of what
that system is supposed to do. Yet one traditional argument for both
freedom of contract and private property is that they define domains in
which individuals may establish both the means and the ends for them-
selves, to pursue as they see fit (so long as they do not infringe upon the
rights of third parties). Private property is an institution that fosters
individualized, if not eccentric, preferences; it does not stamp them out.
We may not understand why property owners want certain obligations
to run with the land, but as it is their land, not ours, some very strong
reason should be advanced before our intentions are allowed to control.
There is no need to filter the private arrangements that should be
respected from those that should not. Parties who wish to create a ser-
vitude can just as easily enter into personal arrangements as real prop-
erty arrangements; in other words, they can negate the intention to
make the servitude run. The very fact that parties unambiguously tie a
servitude to the land suggests that they think it should touch and con-
cern the land. To say, therefore, that particular covenants must be
struck down in the name of freedom is to confound the usual under-
standing on which freedom claims are based. It will not do to argue
13. Reichman, supra note 1, at 1233.
13591982]
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that freedom of alienation with respect to real property does not refer
to the freedom of the individuals who own the land, but instead to the
condition of the land itself and its amenability to further disposition. It
is precisely this misconception of freedom that has allowed the courts
to take an aggressive stance in striking down consensual restraints on
alienation as being against public policy, 4 or worse, inconsistent with
the "inherent nature" of the fee. 5 Insistence upon the touch and con-
cern requirement denies the original parties their contractual freedom
by subordinating their desires to the interests of future third parties,
who by definition have no proprietary claim to the subject property.
Further, it is not possible to justify the touch and concern require-
ment on economic grounds by arguing that under some independent
test of welfare, servitudes fail to promote efficient land use. One objec-
tion to this argument is that it does not explain why the original parties
cannot take into account future transaction costs and incentive effects
in drafting their original agreement. If a seller insists that a personal
covenant bind the land even though it works to the disadvantage of the
immediate or even future purchasers, then the seller will have to accept
a reduction in the purchase price to make good his sentiments. If he is
prepared to accept that reduction, does there exist an independent the-
ory that measures the strength and worth of his preferences-be they
for consumption or investment--or that condemns his choice as unwise
or irrational?
The bankruptcy of the touch and concern requirement is borne out
when we examine more closely the two relevant classes of costs: trans-
action costs and incentive effects.
14. The same point holds true for the traditional restriction that affirmative covenants can-
not run between the buyers and sellers of land. See, e.g., Miller v. Clary, 210 N.Y. 127, 132, 103
N.E. 1114, 1116 (1913). This restriction might have made sense in an earlier era when contract
rights were generally nonassignable, but should play no role once these rights are assignable.
With notice given, a prospective purchaser of the burdened land can reduce his purchase price to
reflect the expected costs of the obligation, require that some fund be placed in escrow to protect
him, or reneg6tiate the terms of the covenant with the original covenantee. That such covenants
may be unwise is one point; that they should be banned on conceptual grounds is quite another.
15. See, e.g., Northwest Real Estate Co. v. Serio, 156 Md. 229, 144 A. 245 (1929), where a
Maryland court voided a covenant which prevented the grantee from selling or renting a parcel of
land without the consent of the grantor, stating that:
The authorities agree that conditions or limitations in restraint of alienation or essential
enjoyment of an estate in fee cannot be validly annexed to the deed or devise by which
the estate is created, because they are repugnant to the inherent nature and qualities of
the estate granted and tend to public inconvenience.
Id. at 233, 144 A. at 246.
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1. Transaction Costs
In the passage quoted above, Professor Reichman insists that the touch
'and concern requirement will reduce transaction costs. To the con-
trary, it will increase them, both at the time of the original sale and in
subsequent transactions. At the time of original sale the touch and con-
cern requirement creates additional transaction costs by imposing one
more external constraint for the parties to satisfy. The touch and con-
cern requirement will have to be evaluated in every case; some cove-
nants will have to be redrafted, and some transactions restructured.
These costs will be incurred at the time that the servitude is created, not
in the future when they can be discounted to their current value. They
are pure deadweight losses, for there are no analagous costs generated
under the freedom of contract alternative.
Even if current costs are ignored, there is no reason to believe that
the retention of the touch and concern requirement will minimize fu-
ture transaction costs. Professor Reichman argues that transaction
costs are reduced because the rule permits the alienation of land with-
out the consent of the holder of a servitude. Yet there is nothing about
a rule which reverses the burden of transacting that necessarily mini-
mizes costs. So long as the original holder of a covenant or his succes-
sor(s) in title are free to repurchase the servitude in question, the rule
(apart from denying the original seller of the land the benefit of a bar-
gain) only changes the identity of the party that must initiate the trans-
action. There is no assurance that the number of transactions, and
their complexity, will be reduced by placing the burden anew on the
original seller. The original transaction provides some evidence that
the original seller wanted the servitude to run against subsequent trans-
ferees. Why assume that his desires are not stable with the passage of
time given that the land to which they were annexed is permanent?
Nor in these circumstances does the subsequent failure of the seller to
reimpose the servitude provide evidence that the parties originally did
not intend for the servitude to run with the land. The re-creation of the
servitude may not take place solely because of the high transaction
costs of the new negotiations. The original owner has lost not only his
leverage in future transactions, but also his ownership interest without
compensation.
The transaction costs argument for the retention of the touch and
concern requirement is dubious from yet another perspective. As fre-
quent cases reveal, there is often an honest dispute as to whether a
1982] 1361
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given servitude touches and concerns the land.16 The Restatement pro-
visions covering this subject are hardly a source of clarity, 17 and the
commentators, most notably Charles Clark,'8 have struggled "without
noteworthy success"' 9 to define the line between covenants which can
run with the land and those which cannot. The rule itself complicates
many transactions whose validity should go unchallenged. For exam-
ple, assume that A and B want to build a party wall2° and that .4 is to
have charge of its maintenance. In assessing the right of 4 (or his as-
signee) to collect the necessary money from B's assignees, why should
we be forced to inquire whether "the promisor's legal relations in re-
spect to the land in question are lessened-his legal interests as owner
rendered less valuable by the promise"?2' Professor Clark in his treat-
ment of the subject shows considerable ingenuity in bringing the party-
wall case within the doctrine of touch and concern. 22 A better solution
is to enforce the promise and dispense with the theory.
The same point is applicable to all other covenants. To be sure,
there will be certain covenants that are manifestly personal. Yet these
are the ones which are the least likely to occur in real estate transac-
tions, because ex ante they are the least likely to work to the mutual
benefit of the original contracting parties. Generally, the transactions
16. See Note, Covenants Running with the Land- Viable Doctrine or Common-Law Relic?, 7
HOFSTRA L. REV. 139, 158-69 (1978).
17. The Restatement of Property reads as follows:
The successors in title to land respecting the use of which the owner has made a
promise can be bound as promisors only if
(a) the performance of the promise will benefit the promisee or other beneficiary
of the promise in the physical use or enjoyment of the land possessed by him,
or
(b) the consummation of the transaction of which the promise is a part will oper-
ate to benefit and is for the benefit of the promisor in the physical use or enjoy-
ment of the land possessed by him,
and the burden on the land of the promisor bears a reasonable relation to the benefit
received by the person benefited.
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 537 (1944).
18. Clark's conception of the test for determining whether a covenant satisfies the touch and
concern requirement is that, "If the promisors legal relations in respect to the land in question are
lessened-his legal interest as owner rendered less valuable by the promise-the burden of the
covenant touches or concerns the land." C. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS
WHICH RUN WITH LAND 97 (2d ed. 1947). This test, described by Clark as "scientific," borrows
from Bigelow, The Content of Covenants in Leases, 12 MICH. L. REV. 639, 645-46 (1914), 30 LAW
Q. REV. 319, 325-26 (1914). The test has the virtue of being circular. Any covenant which is held
to run with the land will lessen its value; any which does not, will not.
19. Thisjudgment is found in C. DONAHUE, T. KAUIER & P. MARTIN, CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON PROPERTY-AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT AND THE INSTITUTION 1124 (1974).
20. For a discussion of party-wall agreements, see C. CLARK, supra note 18, at 149-57.
21. Id. at 97.
22. C. CLARK, supra note 18, at 152-57.
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which come closest to the line will be of greater importance because of
their greater likelihood of making business sense.23 Yet, they also will
be the ones most often litigated if the touch and concern requirement
were retained.
When the status of a servitude is uncertain, the touch and concern
requirement merely introduces an additional transactional barrier to
subsequent transfers of real estate. For example, the purchaser of a
dominant estate may refuse to go forward because his fastidious lawyer
tells him that title is not marketable. Should we expect parties to enter-
tain a lawsuit to establish the validity of a servitude before a sale takes
place or to negotiate with the holders of servient tenements to eliminate
residual uncertainty? These things can be done, but only with high
transaction costs. The touch and concern requirement, under this anal-
ysis, serves only to increase transaction costs and to block transactions.
2. Incentive Effects
The transaction costs associated with the touch and concern require-
ment are magnified when we consider the incentive effects that it pro-
duces. The typical servitude is created by a person who owns an entire
parcel of land and wishes to divide it into several parts. If the original
seller fears judicial nullification under the touch and concern require-
ment, he will take evasive action. He may not sell the land at all, fear-
ing that his servitudes will not run; he may be cautious in selecting his
buyers, although the possibility of transfers at death or by gift will dis-
sipate the security afforded by personal trust; or he may try to frame
the transaction in a way that gives him the right to control future dispo-
sition of the land without the use of servitudes. For example, he may
sell the land with an option to repurchase or a right of first refusal.
These devices allow the original seller to intervene before a sale to a
third party is completed, and thereby to achieve as much as or even
more than servitudes running with the land could accomplish.
But there is a lurking danger: these alternative devices impose re-
strictions that are far more intrusive than simple servitudes, which es-
sentially make clear the permitted uses of land. The scope of the
alternative restrictions renders them less desirable from an economic
point of view than the more tailored restrictions that a robust law of
23. See Dewar v. Goodman, 1909 A.C. 72, in which the landlord of a sublease convenanted
with his tenant to perform certain work on other lands covered by the headlease. The work in
question had to be done in order to prevent the forfeiture of the headlease, and hence the termina-
tion of the sublease. It was held that this lease did not touch and concern the land. The decision
may be wrong, as Clark suggests, supra note 18, at 98 n.18, but why tempt fate?
1982] 1363
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servitudes can foster. Who will develop land if he knows that he is in
peril of losing his gain? How does one value an option to repurchase or
determine the time period for rights of first refusal? There is no reason
to insist upon the touch and concern requirement when its adoption
will foster the use of clumsier devices for land-use control.
Here, as elsewhere, regulation not only frustrates individual lib-
erty, but diminishes overall wealth as well. Perhaps the costs in ques-
tion will be small because so few servitudes will fall to the touch and
concern requirement; certainly, one can imagine more intolerable re-
straints upon the use and disposition of property. Yet this is not an
affirmative argument for retention of the requirement. If the costs in
question are small, the importance of the matter is reduced, but its
proper resolution remains unchanged. Record notice obviates the need
for the touch and concern requirement.
B. CHANGED CONDITIONS
The second restriction I want to address is the changed conditions doc-
trine. The basic insight on this subject, shared by Professors French
and Reichman, is that under a unified theory of servitudes, courts must
retain some residual power to set aside, even between the original par-
ties, those encumbrances that over time prove obsolete, costly, or
wasteful.24 In making this argument, they propose to extend a general
rule of covenants to easements at law that were traditionally considered
to be of infinite duration. The authors were correct to argue for equiv-
alence of treatment, but incorrect to undermine the rule governing
traditional easements. Essentially, their proposition is that servitudes
should be treated like possessory ownership interests. This equivalence
of treatment, however, should extend to the doctrine of changed condi-
tions. Possessory interests, like the fee simple absolute, are not defeasi-
ble because of changed conditions. Servitudes of infinite duration
should be recognized as well.
The argument in favor of expanding the scope of the changed con-
ditions doctrine contains three familiar elements. First, it is said that
the original parties cannot anticipate changed circumstances and,
therefore, cannot guard against them. 25 Second, it is asserted that ser-
vitudes that persist over time give their holders the power to "black-
mail" others long after their servitudes have become obsolete.2 6 Third,
24. French, supra note 1, at 1313, 1316-18; Reichman, supra note 1, at 1258-59.
25. See Reichman,supra note 1, at 1259 (courts impute intent that promise expire if changed
circumstances render the promise valueless).
26. French, supra note 1, at 1316; Reichman, supra note 1, at 1233.
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it is argued that such servitudes generate excessive transaction costs.27
Eliminating obsolete servitudes or allowing their modification is said to
be beneficial on all three counts. A changed condition doctrine indeed
is superior to a doctrine that strikes down many servitudes ab initio
because its proponents are fearful of the future. But, even a limited
doctrine of the sort advocated here is inferior to a complete denial of
public intervention based on changed conditions.
The argument that parties who wish to create a servitude are inca-
pable of providing for future contingencies presumes that such parties
rarely, if ever, consider changed conditions in the course of their nego-
tiations. The argument continues with the additional presumption that,
even if the parties had considered the possibility of changed conditions,
they would have agreed to apply the doctrine and allow for the modifi-
cation or termination of the servitude in question. The analogy to frus-
tration of purpose in contract law is clear. But this justification is one
of construction, not one of public policy. Viewed from this perspective,
its weaknesses become apparent. It is very difficult to collect evidence
of supposed intention years after negotiations are concluded. That is
why most real estate transactions (especially for the protection of third
parties) rely on written agreements which are not supplemented or
modified by terms not contained on the face of a document. This rule
should apply with some force in the case of servitudes. One can never
be sure of the outcome of litigation over implied terms. At the same
time, most servitudes are not casual affairs. If they are recorded, there
is a strong likelihood that the property in question is of sufficient value
that both sides have been represented by lawyers. As a matter of con-
struction, therefore, there is much to be gained by demanding that the
parties to a transaction deal with the contingency of future uncertainty,
just as they must deal with all other contingencies. Doubts that might
exist in the event of contractual silence are eliminated when the parties
have addressed the issue one way or another.
The parties involved in a transaction can be expected to shape
their joint future in a way that promotes their mutual benefit. They
may choose to create discretionary powers in anticipation of changed
conditions. For example, in the case of planned unit communities, dis-
cretionary interests granted to the developer or the homeowners' asso-
ciation commonly function as a device for continuous corporate
27. French, supra note 1, at 1314 (implying that transaction costs are high because of the
difficulty of locating parties and the need for unanimous consent); Reichman, supra note 1, at
1233.
1982] 1365
HeinOnline  -- 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1365 1981-1982
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 55:1353
governance .2 The fact that discretion is often a good thing, however, is
no justification for imposing it from without by terminating servitudes
that are deemed obsolete. With discretion comes uncertainty, and this
parties may rightly (and expressly) fear. A rigid future legal position
eases the strain of renegotiation by allocating property interests at the
outset. Fixed rules relieve the enormous. burden on both courts and
parties of deciding what conduct constitutes an abuse of discretion.
The point is not that certainty is always bad or always good when time
horizons are long. The point is that, given the pervasive ignorance over
the trade-off between the virtues of flexibility and certainty, and be-
tween the vices of indefiniteness and rigidity, there is simply no persua-
sive reason to embrace one extreme to the exclusion of the other.
Professor Reichman suggests that courts should be permitted to
modify as well as terminate servitudes that are considered obsolete be-
cause of changed conditions. While a richness of remedies might serve
as a check on overly broad intervention, the confusion that Professor
Reichman's proposal would bring to the litigation and settlement of
actual cases would be unjustifiably great. Long temporal horizons
make any present determination of utility imperfect by definition. The
relevant question, therefore, is whether judicial determinations are su-
perior to private ones. The original parties can provide for changed
conditions if they so desire at the time when servitudes are created.
And when disputes arise there is no apparent reason to consider judi-
cial coercion superior to consensual renegotiation.
The second argument, that permanent easements encourage the
holders of servitudes to extort large sums from those who wish to buy
them out, is misplaced in principle. Here it is worth taking note of
what ownership means in the context of the fee simple absolute in pos-
session, i.e., the right to hold out. Suppose that A owns land which he
does not wish to develop and that B wants this land as part of a larger
parcel assembled for the most. modem and productive use. B cannot
simply take the land and escape all payment by showing the social su-
periority of his own plans and intentions. Nor can B take the land
from -4 even if he is prepared to pay him some reserve price, reflective
of its value in current use. Ownership is meant to be a bulwark against
the collective preferences of others; it allows one, rich or poor, to stand
alone against the world no matter how insistent or intense its collective
28. For a discussion of the discretionary powers retained by developers and homeowners'
associations, see R. ELLICKSON & D. TARLOCK, LAND-USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS
633-34, 639-47, 649-51 (1981).
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preferences. To say that ordinary ownership presents a holdout prob-
lem is not to identify a defect in the system; it is to identify one of its
essential strengths. If a holdout is adamant, no private party canforce
him to sell the land in question at any price. The state may intervene
under its eminent domain powers, but only when it acts for "public
use," and not for the narrow interests of B (or those whom he wishes to
serve).
The public use requirement is attenuated when the state itself
wants to initiate changes. But it is of special importance when, in ef-
fect, a forced purchase is demanded by one private party of another.2 9
In the hypothetical case outlined above, B's quest for development may
be shared by many. But in an age of environmental concerns, it may
be opposed by many as well. It hardly matters which is the case, as
there is no justification for granting any individual the power to act as
the self-appointed guardian of the public at large or to undermine the
stability of existing legal rights.
This basic argument has specific application to the law of servi-
tudes. One illustration is that under the traditional law of nuisance, a
private party could not create a nuisance, and thus obtain a servitude,
simply by paying another party damages." The objection to such an
arrangement was quite simple: a private party does not possess "a pri-
vate power of eminent domain," which would allow him to force an
exchange on terms capturing all of the gain for himself.
The unified servitude proposed by Professors Reichman and
French should be on an equal footing with possessory interests. The
power of the original party to hold out, to maintain his servitude
against his neighbor, marks the vitality of nascent ownership. The
power of eminent domain (subject to serious public use limitations)
should remain the only way for the state to extinguish property inter-
29. See, e.g., Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REv. 203
(1978), where it is proposed that the public use requirement in 'private takings,' as when landown-
ers need to acquire access to their real property, should be allowed only if 50% excess compensa-
tion is paid. Id. at 236-37, 243. In general, the public use limitation has little, if any,
constitutional bite today, except in cases involving the condemnation of excess land. See generally
Comment, The Effect of the Public Use Requirement on Excess Condemnation, 48 TENN. L. REV.
370, 372-81 (1981) (documenting the current trend toward giving public use a broad definition).
30. See, e.g., Holman v. Athens Empire Laundry Co., 149 Ga. 345, 359-60, 100 S.E. 207, 214
(1919). See generally Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in A System of Strict Liability, 3 J.
LEGAL STUD. 165, 198-201 (1974) (arguing that courts should have a greater interest in protecting
individual rights than in protecting the profits of individuals who invade those rights); McClin-
tock, Discretion to Deny Injznction Against Trespass and Nuisance, 12 MINN. L. REv. 565, 569-76
(1928) (criticizing refusal of some courts to "balance the equities").
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ests. Public intervention should not be allowed to supplant consensual
arrangements in private disputes. Bilateral monopolies arise whenever
the law gives someone-owner, creditor, claimant-an exclusive right
to anything against someone else. In the context of servitudes, holdouts
should be treated with respect for their autonomy as persons. Holdouts
are not, by definition, a problem ripe for solution by judicial
intervention.
My response to the third argument, that the changed conditions
doctrine reduces transaction costs, parallels the analysis previously
made of the touch and concern rule. In ideal form, a changed condi-
tions doctrine would reduce the number of parties between whom ne-
gotiations must take place in order to transfer title to a fee. In practice,
however, the rule would not have that effect. As with the touch and
concern requirement, legitimate doubt as to whether the doctrine ap-
plied would always exist. If Professor Reichman's position were
adopted, it might only serve to change and not to eliminate the domi-
nant tenement. In any event, the legal restraint on private negotiations
imposed by the doctrine would make original transactions more costly
to negotiate, and force parties into legal arrangements avoiding its re-
strictions. Because of the fragmentation of interests caused by servi-
tudes, the transaction cost problem will always exist. Government
intervention, uncertain by nature, can do little to alleviate that
problem.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Comment is wholly normative. It is to show that
once we remove the historical fetters which have so long bound the law
of servitudes, there is no strong reason not to take a fresh view of the
entire subject. We should accept as a basic proposition that contract
terms shall be binding on the original parties and on all third parties
who take land with record notice of the restrictions in question. There
will, of course, be complications involving fraud, duress, estoppel, and
modification, as there are in any contractual situation. There will also
be a host of interpretative questions to be answered: servitudes are de-
ceptive in their apparent simplicity and real estate lawyers typically do
not appreciate the myriad of problems that are raised and left un-
resolved by their creation. While none of these problems can be solved
prior to any particular case, matters can be kept simpler by removing
doctrinal restrictions that both complicate the basic analysis and limit
the effectiveness of servitudes.
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